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Draft Recommendation
on transatlantic cooperalion on European anti-missile defence
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling the need it has repeatedly expressed for the creation of a space-based surveillance and
early-rvarning system, on the basis of which it would be possible to consider the option of a European
anti-missile defence system;
(i, Bearing in mind that steps, albeit modest, taken ri'ithin our own Organisation to develop a Euro-
pean space-based observation system, nevertheless represent progress;
(tii) Noting that there has been no progress uhatsoever as far as European early-rvarning and anti-
missile defence sl,stems are concerned;
0v) Considenng the reality of the threat from theatre missiles and also the emergent threat from
medium-range missiles;
(r) Taking account, moreover, of the existrng threat from mrssiles armed u,ith chemical or biologi-
cal rvarheads and of the fact that a nuclear threat is foreseeable in the medium term,
(w) Bearrng rn mind other emergent threats such as, for example, that of land-attack cruisc mrssrles
(LACMs);
(vit) Welcoming the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventronal Arms and Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies rvhich, together rvith other existrng regimes, can provide for genurne con-
trol over behavtour that represents or might come to represent a proliferation threat and a danger to
securrty,
(vtr) Notrng, hou'ever, that all such regrmes unfortunatell' cannot completell, eradicate the nsks and
threats thev are rntended to counter,
0x) Welcoming the existence of the Franco-Italian FSAF (Future Surface-to-Arr Familr,) pro-
gramme, knoun as Aster, for rvhrch approval has just been grven for the industrrahsatron and produc-
tion stage.
(x) Notrng. furthermore, u'ork carned out by the United States and Canada in the anti-missile
defence field.
(xi) Wclcomrng also the MEADS (Medium Extended Air-Defcnce System) prograrnme rnvolvrng the
United States. Germany'and Italy.
(ni) Consrdcrtng the studies carried out b1' NATO in the areas of Extended Arr Defence and Thcatre
Missrle Defence;
(xtu) Recalling, finally, Recommendation 571 on transatlantic cooperation on European antr-missile
defence,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COTINCIL
l. Pursuc rvith far greater urgencv than rs currently the case its discussions on the development of a
corrrmon antr-ballistic mi ssile defence svstcml
2. Keep the Assembly'informed of progress on the study on European antr-missile defence entrusted
to the Specral Workrng Group;
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3. Bring together studies on anti-missile defence being conducted at national level by various mem-
ber countnes of the Organisation;
4. Examine the possibility of cooperation betwecn the United States and Europe over anti-missrlc
defence, especially theatre missile defence;
5. Urge France to rejoin the MEADS project and the Unrted Krngdom to consider joining it under rts
Strategic Defence Review,
6. Keep the Assembly informed of progress on studies on the development of a European space-
based observation system;
7. Inform the Assembly whether, in accordance with paragraph 38 of the Noordiviijk Declaration,
an independent early-warning capability has been studied and, if so, what conclusions have been
reached;
8. Establish contact between WEU and the BMDO forthrvith, so that all the above matters can bc
studied jointll'.
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Exp lanatory Memoran d u m
(submitted by Mr Atkinson, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The present report is intended as a follorv-
up to the research undertaken by our Committee,
starting in 1992, on Europe's need to acquire an
anti-missile defence system.
2. Assembly Document 1339 (6 November
1992, "Anti-ballistic Missile Defence", Rap-
porteur: Mr Lenzer) and the Sl.rnposium on Anti-
missile Defence for Europe (Rome, April 1993)
highlighted the need to create a space-based sur-
veillance and early-warning sl,stem on the basls
of rvhich rt u'ould be possible to consider the op-
tron of an anti-missile defence s),stem.
3 Such a system will need to Lake account,
first, of European requirements and also research
already undertaken in this field by the United
States.
4 The first part of the present report
(Assembly, Document 1435,9 November 1994),
dealing u'ith transatlantic cooperation on anti-
missile defence, u'as drafted b1'1'our Rapporteur,
after a vrsit by our Commrttee to the United
States, s'here contacts of srgruficant interest were
made u'ith the polrtical and mrlrtary authontres
and urth the US defence industry
5 In the ensuing Recommendation 571 on
"Transatlantic cooperation on European anti-
missile defence", the Assemblr' first asked to be
kept rnformed by the WEU Councrl about prog-
ress made on the studv on European antr-missrle
defence being conducted b1, the Special Working
Group.
6. In its Reply, the Council stated that the
study, entitled "A prehmrnan' anal1,'sis of the
risks of missile technologl' proliferatron on the
southern flanks of u'estern Europe'', had been
temporanlv suspended
7 . The Council moreover recalled paragraph
25 of the "Preliminary conclusions on the formu-
lation of a comrnon defence pohc1,'', ri.hrch stated
that "WEU should strengthen its operational cap-
ability and develop militarl' and operatronal as-
pects of security such as . the question of Euro-
pean antl-missile defence"
8. Lastly, the Council expressed confidence
that work on the subject would soon be resumed
by the Special Working Group. As far as your
Rapporteur ls aware, three years on, there has
been no change whatsoever in the position.
9. The replies to the other recommendations
made by the Assembly m Recommendation 571
*'ere hardly more encouraging. Thus in relation
to the request for contacts to be established bet-
rveen WEU and the Ballistic Missile Defence
Organisation (BMDO) the Council replied that it
lvould consider the rssue once discussions on the
possibrlrties of cooperation betrveen the United
States and Europe on anti-mrssile defence had
been finalised.
l0 Our colleague, Mr Blaaurv, m his address
to the lfth Internatronal Conference on Theatre
Missile Defence (TMD) at Erlat on 23 June
1997, stated that "no ballistrc mrssile risk analy-
sis has y,et been made and the WEU Councrl's
Special Working Group has not conducted the
study on European anti-missile defence u'hich
had been asked for Neither has any serious study
taken place regarding a European early-waming
system".
I I. In the meantime, our US allies have con-
tinued to make progress ln terms of both theory
and practrce Recently, Mr Kaminsky, Defence
Under-Secretary for Acquisrtron and Technology
at the US Department of Defence, addressed the
House Commrttee on National Secuntl,'s Mili-
tary Research and Devclopment Subcommittee
on the sublect of ballistic missile defence (6
March, 1997)
12 He noted that the in-theatre threat to the
allies and for deploy,ed US forces abroad rvas
real and lncreaslng In hrs vieu' thousands of
short-range missiles rvere at present deployed on
hundreds of mrssrle launchers in at least 30
countries, somc of rvhich might be considercd
hostrle The threat lvas here and norv, rvidc-
spread and should be taken very senouslv
13 In parallel, there u'as another emcrgent
threat from medium-range mrssiles Accordrng to
Mr Kamrnsky, some countries u-ere developing
their own medium-range missrles (he referred
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particularly to North Korea and its No Dong
mrssile); others, among them Iran, had already
bought this missile or wcre intending to do so.
14. There rvas also the further threat of mrs-
siles armed u'ith chemical and brological war-
heads. In Mr Kaminsky's opinion, this could
come from North Korea, Iran and Lib1,a, coun-
tries with extensive chemical weapons pro-
grarnmes.
15 A nuclear threat was also predictable in
the medium term; Iraq and North Korea were in
fact close to acquiring nuclear capability al-
though the Gulf War, m the case of the first, and
the Frameu,ork Agreement, as far as the second
was concemed, had called a halt to those pro-
grammes. Iran u'as rvorking torvards the same
end, but rvould not achieve it for many years to
come.
16. Moreover, Russia had a major capacity for
suppll,ing strategic nuclear weapons and their
delivery s),stems (land-based, submanne-launch-
ed missiles and long-range aircraft). Chrna, too,
was in the same position.
17 . Another emergent threat u'as land-attack
cruise missrles (LACMs) LACMs $'ere at pres-
ent dcploy'ed in the Unrted States, France and
Russra but these capabilities u,ere being devel-
oped in a dozen or so countries. Accordmg to Mr
Kamrnskl,. thc nations giving rise to the greatest
concern rn this regard rvere at present working on
short-range ballistic missiles, hence wide pro-
liferation of high-technology LACMs was
unlikely till some l0 to l5 years hence.
18 Horvevcr, there rvas a real threat here and
nolv from antr-ship cruise missiles in over 70
countries, rvhich could be modified to include
ground attack capabilitl, in a year or trvo's time
19. The overall situation, undoubtedll, worry-
ing, does not appear hou'ever to concern the
WEU Councrl undul1,, as noted above, or the
majority' of European governments, since only
three of them: those of Germany,, France and
Itall', have taken the threat seriously, as is clear
from their involvement m the rvork on the
medrum extended air-defence system (MEADS)
(France s,ithdreu'in 1996) MEADS rvill be dis-
cussed extensively, in a later chapter
20. In the chaptcrs that folloiv, your Rap-
porteur u'ill attempt to dcscribe the present posi-
tion as regards anil-missrle defencc rn Europe
and North America (the United States and Can-
ada) and transatlantrc cooperation in this field
21. The table belou' shou's exrstrng anti-mis-
sile defence prograrnmes rvorldurde. To them
should be added the bilateral Japan-US study
that ri'ill enable the Japanese Government to take
a decision on possible ballistic missile defence
(BMD) capabilitres in the context of ivider Japa-
nese defence policy.
Exoatmospheric programmes Endoatmos pheric proqrammes
Encrgy weapons Space-based laser (US)
Strategic Defence Intiative (US)
Arrbome laser (US)
Mrd-rnfrared advanced chemrcal laser (US)
Tactrcal high-energy,laser (THEL) (US and Israel)
Krnetic \\'eapons Atmospheric interceptor
tcchnologres (US)
Exoatmospheric kill'v'ehrcle
(US)
Lightu,eight exoatmosphenc
projectrle (US)
Theatre Hrgh Altitude Arca
Defence (US)
Arrou'(Israel and US)
Harvk Sl,stem (US)
Medrum cxtendcd arr-defence s1'stem (US,
Germanl', and Itall')
Navl,Area BMD programme (US)
Patriot (US)
Patriot PAC-3 (US)
Medium-rangc anti-arrcraft s1'stem (SAMP/T,
Aster Mrssile) (ltali and France)
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II. Missile proliferation control
The MTCR
22. The Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) has already been studied by our
Committee on tu'o previous occasions' the first in
April 1992, in Document 1305 ("Arms export
policy", Rapporteur: Mr Aarts) and subse-
quently, in 1994, in the first part of the present
report (Document 1435: "Transatlantic coopera-
tion on European anti-missile defence") b1, the
present Rapporteur.
23. Little that is neu' can be added to what has
already been said and 1,our Rapporteur rvill
therefore confine himself to recalhng very briefly
the philosophy underlyrng this informal arrange-
mcnt.
24 The MTCR deals with transfers of equip-
ment and technologl, connected rvith missiles.
All requests for such transfers must take the fol-
lourng set of consrdcrations into account:
prevention of prohferation of \\,eap-
ons of mass destruction;
- 
the capabilities and objectives of
the missile and space programmes
of the recrpient state:
- 
the significance of the transfer in
terms of the potentral development
of systems for producing weapons
of mass destructron:
- 
an assessment of the end use of the
transfers, includrng the assurance of
the recipient state that they are to
be used only for the purpose stated,
that neither such use nor the rtems
transferred rvill be modrfied or dup-
hcated s'ithout the prior consent of
the supplier government and that
nerther the items, nor any rephcas
nor denvatives. rvrll be re-trans-
ferred rvithout the consent of the
supplier government
25. The MTCR further provides that these
principles u,ill form part of the respective legis-
lations of the signatory countnes.
The Ll/as s enaar Arrangement
26. The demise of the Coordinating Commrttee
for Multrlateral Export Controls (COCOM) in
early 1994 led to the start of discussrons on the
creatron of a successor organisation adapted to
the new international srtuation.
27. Differences emerged from the outset bet-
lveen the former COCOM members (NATO
countrres excepting Iceland, plus Australia and
Japan) over the intnnsic objectives of export
controls and particularll' as to which countries
represented or could represent a strategic threat.
28. Such disagreements can be attributed to
diffcring American and European perceptions
Thc list of products subject to control was an-
other area ofdispute.
29. In Document 1435, rt was suggestcd that
the nerv successor body to COCOM should cover
conventional rveapons and any relevant technol-
ogy and should also concentrate on countries that
constituted a threat in proliferation terms and a
dangcr to regional stabrlrtl, m other u'ords, as far
as the US rvas concerned, countries such as
Libya, Iran, Iraq and North Korea
30. This rvas the spirit in u'hich the so-called
Wassenaar Arrangement rvas concluded. On I8-
19 December 1995, the representatives of 28
countrresl, meeting in Wassenaar (Netherlands)
agreed to set up thc Wassenaar Arrangement on
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-use Technologies.
31. Thus, for the first time. a multilateral
global regime rvas created, covering both arma-
ments and dual-use goods and technologres, in
order to counter the neu'threats to securitl,m the
post-cold rvar world, b1, offering greater trans-
parenc\/ and sharing mformatron on armaments
and technologl'transfer across the rvorld.
32 The 28 original countries u'ere 
.;omed by
Argcntina, Romanra and South Korea. Bulgaria
I Australia. Austna. Belgrum, Canada, the Czcch
Repubhc, Dcnmark, Frnland, France, Germanl',
Greece, Hungar_v, Ireland, Itall', Japan, Luxembourg.
the Netherlands, Nerv Zealand, Noruay, Poland.
Portugal, the Russran Federatron. the Slovak
Republtc. Spain, Su,eden, Surtzerland, Turke1,. thc
United Kingdom and the Unrted States
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and Llkraine rvere to join somc months later. As
indicated earlier, COCOM membership rvas
confincd to NATO members, apart from Iceland,
and with the addition of Austraha and Japan.
Membership of the neu' regime was open on a
general, non-discriminatory basis to all countries
accepting the criteria lard doun.
33. These stated that member countries
should:
be producers or exporters of arma-
ments or technology and dual-use
goods relating to annaments,
- 
have appropriate national policies
such as, for example, not selling
arrns or sensrtive dual-use items to
countries rvhosc behaviour was a
source of concem.
compll' *'ith international larvs and
standards on non-prohferatron, and
rmplement 100% effective export
controls.
34. For all the member countnes and in par-
trcular the Unrted States, the Gulf War u'as a
determining factor in the establishment of the
critena and in the negotiatrons leadrng to the
Wassenaar Arrangement.
35. The arrangement was intcnded as a re-
mrnder of the dangers to mternational peace and
securitl' arrsing from the destabrhsing accumula-
tion of conventronal rveaponn, and indiscriminate
exportation of armaments and sensitive dual-use
technology.
36. The fault 1a1', as u'as generalll' acknow-
ledged. both u'ith eastern and rvestcrn countnes,
rvhich, by supplying arrns to Iraq. had made
possrble the build-up of the mrlrtary machrne
Saddam Hussem used to mvade Kuivait
37 . To prevent future Iraqs. governments are
to exchange rnformation on potcntral threats to
peace and international and regronal stabilrtl',
paying particular attention to undercover projects
and dubious procurement mcthods
38. There u'rll also be regular rnformation ex-
change on transfers of certain sensitive dual-use
technologres and goods to countnes not parb'to
the Wassenaar Arrangement. A list of over onc
hundred such products, includrng machme-tools,
computers and telecommunications, has been
prepared u,th a vrerv to this exchange.
39. Such transparenc), in the transfer of sensi-
tivc technology and dual-use goods w'ill help
identifl, procurement that might threaten intcr-
national or regional peacc
40. Srmrlarly there uill be transparency as far
as arrnaments are concemcd. Information on
arms transfers u,ill be provided on the basis of a
\\'eapons list (in princrple comprising categories
of major \\'eapons s1'stems) alreadl' used for the
CFE Treatl'and the UN arms regrster The rvish
to redefine and extend this list to cover the latest
weapons has also been expressed.
41. Finally' it rs u'orth pointing out that thc
Wassenaar Arrangemcnt is based on national
controls, as is the MTCR. and that it is not drr-
ected agarnst an1' countrv or group of countries.
Furthermore the arrangement u,ill not prevent
bona fde transactions going ahead, nor interferc
with thc right of states to acqulre legitimate
mcans of self defence Rather rt focuses on be-
haviour, particularll, dangerous behavrour
42. Thus one of the dcclared aims is strength-
ening coopcration to prevent procurcment of
arms and dual-use products for military purposes
if the regional situation or conduct of the state is,
or could become, a cause of serious concern to
states party to the arrangement,
43. The first plenary sesslon of the Wassenaar
Arrangement rvas held in Vrerura on 11-12 July'
1996 There, the 3l member countrics2, rvith the
approval of their respectlve govemments,
reached agreement on the proposals originalll'
draun up in Wassenaar.
44. The partrcrpant countnes urll control all
the ltems referred to on the List of Dual-use
Goods and Technologres and on the neu' muni-
tions list, u'ith a vle\\'to prevcnting non-author-
ised transfers or re-transfers of those rtems
45 This hst has tu'o appendices. one contaln-
ing sensrtivc items and the other a limrted number
of very sensrtivc rtems
46 Finally, thc hst u'rll bc revrsed regularll'to
take account of technologrcal dcvelopment and
2 Bulgaria and Ukraine t\ere rn the process of
joining at this juncture
DOCUMENT I588
reflect experience gained. It should be noted that
missiles and the various components thereof are
part of the list.
47. The Wassenaar Arrangement represents
substantial changes in objectives and procedures
as compared rvith its predecessor, COCOM. It
should be recalled that the Iatter was established
during the cold-rvar period in response to the
threat posed by the Soviet Union and rts allies.
Through it the West sought to maintarn its
qualitative battlefield superiority b1, virtual pro-
hibition of arms sales to communist countries
and through export controls on strategic products
and technical data
48. Nou' the threat of the cold war has re-
ccded, other nerv threats have emerged 
- 
among
them that of the prohferation of weapons of mass
dcstructron. This has led to the development of
non-prohferation regimes such as the MTCR,
referred to earlier, the Nuclear Suppliers Group
or the Austraha Group.
49 Thc Wassenaar Arrangement extends and
complements such regimes, but rt should be noted
that rt is not as yet to thc entire satisfaction of
ever), country A case in point is the Unrtcd
States, u'hich complams of being alone in sup-
portng advance notification of transfers Nor has
the Unrted States managed to prevail as regards
its srsh to concentrate information exchange on
unstable reglons rvhere securiry, nsks are great-
est, as other partrcipants have raised objectrons
to targeting specific reglons or countries. The
ven' nature of the Wassenaar Arrangement u'ill
in future make it possible to modrfu critena and
procedures.
50 In anv event, the Wassenaar Arrangcment
provides a suitable frameu'ork. and one that can
be rmproved on. for countermg threats to securrtv
in todar,'s rvorld. It provides an appropnate rn-
strument in the fight agarnst proliferatron. al-
though one ri'hich clearll, cannot completell'
eradrcate the rrsks and threats rt endeavours to
combat, Both the Arrangcment and the MTCR
are tools surted to combating missile prohfera-
tion
III. Research carried out in Europe
on qnti-missile defence
5I In a studl' prepared b1' Lreutenant-Colo-
ncls Schmidt of the German Air Force and
Verschuur of the Royal Netherlands Air Force
for the Air War College of the Air University
(Maxrvell Air Force Base Alabama) in Apnl of
this year, entitled 'the European theatre missile
defence prograrnme 
- 
a field for international
cooperation", it was suggested that the !'ery con-
srderable extent to rvhich Europe lags behind
u'ith regard to a future anti-missile defence rs
fundamentally' due to budgetary causes.
52. While these are of major importance, your
Rapporteur nevertheless regards reasons of a
political ordcr as the main ones preventing this
issue being tacklcd in an in-depth and resolute
fashion.
53 Tcrence Ta1,lor, Assistant Director at the
International Institute for Strategrc Studies,
notes3 that "thcre is a confused situation about
rvhat is the real threat and u,hat u'e u'ould defend
in Europe and u'ho is European" addrng that "the
threat is there and if it becomes more obvious the
prtch could then change But y'ou can't just
srvitch on a missrle defence programme in a short
time"
54. The WEU Council's Reply,to Recommen-
datron 571 from ths Assembly, to rvhrch we re-
ferred in the introductron to this report. stating
that a preliminarl, analysis of the risks of mrssile
technology prolifcration on the southern flanks of
Western Europe had been temporanll, suspendcd
is merely the result of a lack of politrcal x'ill rn
Europe, compounded by, cuts in the defence
budgets of practicalll' all of our countries.
55 Alongsrde thc transatlantic coopcratron
prograrrunes, u-hrch u-e u'rll consrder later, or the
u'ork carried out b1, NATO, q'hich rvill also be
discussed in a later chapter of thrs report, and
apart from the studies undertaken b1' France on
earlv-u'arnrng and anti-mrssrle defcnce
(EPAMINONDAS) and those berng carrred out
by'the Unrted Krngdom, thc only' tangrble rcalitl'
rn Europe as regards antr-missrle defencc rs
Aster
56 What initrallr- began as a Franco-ltahan
antr-aircraft defence cvcntuallv turncd lnto an
antt-mrssrle defencc svstcm rn viov of the fact
that u'hrle the carher svstem u'as berng devcl-
oped. rt became clcar that herc u'as an rntrinsrc
J 
-4t,ration ll'eek ancl Spacc 7'echnologv'. 3 March.
199'7
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capability u'hich could be extended to anti-mrs-
sile defence. Germany rvas also involved in the
initial studics but withdrew from the project to
concentrate primarily'on the MEADS system.
57. In 1989 the Eurosam consortium was
formed to manage the Future Surface-to-Air
Family (FSAF) also knorvn as Aster. The con-
sortium members are Aerospatiale, Alenia and
Thomson CSF
58. FSAF was designed for anti-aircraft, anti-
air-to-surface missile, anti-surface-to-surface
missile and anti-cruise missile defence to attack
ship targets and there is a possibility of its being
developed for short rangc anti-ballistic missile
defence. For the moment four versions of FSAF
missiles are planned, the SAAM (Naval surface-
to-air anti-mrssile system) rvhrch u'ill use the
Aster 15 mrssrle; the SAMP/T (land-based me-
dium-range surface-to-air missrle) and the
SAMP/N (ship-based medium-range surface-to-
air missrle), both of u'hrch u'rll use the Aster 30,
and a fourth version capable of intercepting tac-
tical balhstic missile targets. The SAMP, both rn
the land-based and shrp-based versions, u'ill
carry extra sensors to increase its ARABEL ra-
dar capabilitl' rvhrch means that the svstem can
vsork in a medium u'here jamming devrces are
being used.
59. FSAF is a bilateral programme, as an antl-
aircraft system, capable of possible ABM exten-
sion, u,hich implies some practrcal advantages
such as VAT exemptron.
60 In 1988, a full development contract rvas
signed covermg ARABEL radarso and EMPAR,
the fire control s)'stem and the Aster l5
(SAAM). A second contract, rn 1990. covcred
the Aster 30 SAMP/T and the ARABEL radar
systems. The French and Italian Govemments
envisage procunng the SAAM. SAMP/T and
SAMPN svstems and in 1993 the Bntish Gov-
ernment reached agreement rvrth the French and
Italian governments on the Pnncipal Antr-air
Missrle System (PAAMS), based on an upgrade
of the Aster 30 to be rnstalled on frigates rn the
Horizon programme. rlhich rs rtself a joint pro-
gramme involving the same three countries
6 t. To complete development of this sy'stcm a
ne\\, consortium u,as set up uhrch included thc
three original Eurosam contractors, plus British
Aerospace Dl,namics, GEC-Marconi and
Siemens Plessey, the ne\4' consortium being
knou.n as EUROPAAMS. A Spanish consortium
made a bid to join FSAF in l99l but the atrempt
failed to due to lack offinancial support from the
Spanish Government.
62 The French aircraft carrier Charles de
Gattlle rvill be equipped rvith SAAM Aster 15
missiles, complete rvith ARABEL (SAAM)
radar. The Italian Garibaldi SAAM/F cruisers
will also carry the SAAM Aster 15 fitted rvith
EMPAR radar (SAAMJ).
63. Lastly, rn early June 1997 good nervs on
Aster rvas mountings. First the au-ard was an-
nounced of an export contract for Saudi Arabia
to fit out three SAWARI II frigates u,rth antr-
arrcraft weapons. Secondly PAAMS rvas vah-
dated by the authorities of the three countnes.
hence the formation of the EUROPAAMS group
referred to above, and lastly, the French and
Italian Govcrnments have definitell'agreed to the
industrialisation and production stage of the
Aster systcm. Aster has already proved rts effi-
crency. On 8 April 1991 at the French DGA's
Landes Test Centre, the Aster 15 intercepted a
simulated Sea Skimmer (anti-shrp missile fl1,rng
at the surface of the water) The Aster 15 inter-
cepted the target, a C22 travelling at a speed of
I 000 kilometres per hour and at a herght of 10
metres above the surfacc.
64. In June of the same vear another Aster 15
rntercepted an anti-ship Exocet mrssile MM38
flyrng al an approximate speed of Mach I
launched from the French fngate Tourvlle T\e
French daily Le Monde6 stated that the cost of
the research and development phase was ap-
proximately' FF 10 billion betrveen 1990 and
2000 and the rndustrialisation and rrutral produc-
tion stage estimated originallv at FF 8 bilhon had
been reduccd to FF 5 brlhon after an agreement
with the producers rn both countnes Costs are to
be shared equally betu'een France and Italr,. and
according to Aerospatiale. the programme u'ill
impact on a markct rvhich until nou'has been a
United Statcs monopoly and rvhose value can be
' See lrr et Cosntos/.4t,tation Internatronal No 1616,
Friday,6 June 1997.
6 Le lvlonde, l7 June 1997.o Jan"'s Slrategtc lVeapons. January 1997
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estlmated at some FF 50 billion, s),stems, muni-
trons and environment included.
IV. Anti-ballistic missile defence
in the United States and Canada
65 Within the United States there are two
principal operational areas of ballistic missile
defence (BMD). The first is national missile de-
fence Q.{MD) u,hich mainly encompasses the 50
states of the US. The second is theatre missile
defence (TMD) relating to $'eapons and other
s1'stems that support US mrlrtary forces, the US
Allies, coalition partners and frrcndll, nations
outsidc the boundaries of the United States itself.
66 Assembh,Document 1435 refers mainly to
the NMD programrnes and the purpose of this
chapter is to cxamine horv the srtuatron has de-
veloped, anall,sc new projects and assess coop-
eration u'ith Canada. To this end, tu,o areas will
be taken into consideration: earlv rvarning (land
and space-based) and mlssile defence (land, sea,
arr and space-based).
67 Frrst of all. it is rmportant to understand
u'hv the Unrted States feels the need for a BMD
and x'h1, it pushes rts allies in thrs drrectron b1,
offenng final products and cooperation pro-
grarnmes The ballistrc mrssrle threat emanatcs
from drfferent regrons of the u'orld.
68. For example, Russra retalns the capabrlity
to threaten the United States, desprte the end of
the cold rr'ar The Russian Government is not
considered to be hostrle an), longer but at the
same time its milrtarv and economrc instability
gives rise to concerns about the possibilrtl, of
accrdental launches or the serzure of one or more
missrles by' a group of rogue offrcers. It is not
feasrble to consrdcr thc possrbrlrtv of the US and
Russia agreeing to re-target lntcrcontlnental bal-
hstrc missrles (lCBMs) because Russia can re-
target its missilcs against the US rn about 30
seconds and the trme the Amcrrcans requlre ls
almost the same. In addrtron, rt rs important to
stress that such an agreement could not be veri-
fied. Moreover, the Russran Governmcnt rs sell-
mg tts technologies to Third World buy,crs
69. Dcspitc its commercial partnershrp uith
the Unrted States and the good relations both
countries en;oy', China is nonetheless consrdered
as a threat because of rts technologrcal capabrh-
tres. In fact, rt is estrmated that it has more than a
dozen ICBMs and the Chinese Government is
Iooking tou'ards rndependently targetcd re-entry
vehiclcs, rvhrch, from a military point of vreu',
alloii'multiple warheads to be carried on a single
missile. Finally, rt is also acquiring components
of the core Russran missiles arsenal. China's
main stratcgrc objectrve is probabll' not the US
but should rather be envisaged as berng directed
at other Asian regions. In an1, evcnt, it is part of
US policy to be ready to take action if necessary.
70. Other countries may also represent a stra-
tegic and tactical threat to the US because of
their ICBM capabilities and their rogue politics:
among the Third World countries, North Korea
is beheved to present the greatcst danger bccause
of its efforts to develop long-rangc missiles and
carry out nuclear, chcmrcal and biological
armaments programmes Hou,cvcr. it is thought
that it urll not have the capabilitv required to
strikc the United States untrl aftcr the first decade
of the next centun'
71. Accordrng to some US sources, Iran is a
country that poses a great threat to regional
stabilit]' in the Mrddle East, not only because it
has alreadv used ballistic and cruise missiles as
u'ell as chemrcal \\'eapons, but mainly because its
logic rs drfferent from Western logic in that it rs
based on the principles of ;rhad, the Mushm holy
u'ar. Iraq too rcpresents a regional threat, mainly
as a result of the Gulf War. It rs imporLant to
remember that the Persian Gulf is a region rich in
orl, a ven' important strategrc resourcc both from
an economlc and a politrcal point of vierv. It is in
the Amerrcan rnterest for the region to be stable
and its busrness partners there to be secure bc-
cause the cssencc of US resources policy rs that
it tries to save its ourr rcsourccs bv rmportrng the
same ra\\'matenals from abroad
72 In conclusron. the ballistrc missrle threat
from the Mrddle East does not constitute a direct
threat from a terrrtonal pornt of vres- but rather a
threat to thc economrc and polrtrcal mterests of
the Unrted States m that regron The srtuation
mrght changc rn the future but at thrs stagc rt rs
the marn reason rihv the US is also rntercsted rn
a theatrc mrssrle defcnce system that could be
deployed rn thc area
73 The same conccpts ma1' also bc vahd for
Lrby'a. evcn though that country could be scen as
a potentral thrcat marnh, because it alreadl' trred
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to launch a missile against Italy about a decade
ago. Moreover, it has programmes for the devel-
opment of biological and chcmical rveapons as
rvell as ballistic missrles, even if such pro-
grarnmes are proceeding at a slow pace.
74. Other countries that have ballistic missile
capabilities are Japan, Israel and Indra but the
first two are close allies of the US, and moreover
have cooperation prograflrmes rvith the Ameri-
cans in the field of ballistic missile defence. India
might bc considcred a threat to the US on ac-
count of its technological capabilitics. But in any
case, in the field of intemational politics today's
friends could easily tum into tomorrorv's enemies
and it is difficult to foresee hou' the international
environment u,ill develop in the long term, par-
ticularly as far as a possible rvorld porver hke
India is concemed.
75. There are several reasons u,h1' the US
Government is pushing its allies tou'ards coop-
eration programmes rn this field First of all,
from an economrc point of vieu', cooperating
means sharrng costs as x'ell as risks For those
allies, cooperating u,ith thc US means having
access to American technologl' and knorv-hou,.
The Americans, for their part. can assess their
allies' technological and financral capabilitres
76. It is unportant to remember that US stra-
tegrc needs are different from European strategic
needs and in thrs sensc it is onll' logrcal that the
Unrted States should be developing its own sys-
tems and tryrng to sell them to its allies, partll'
because it is in its economic interest to do so and
partly because European countnes are also
seckrng to develop specrfic technologies in this
field.
77. As far as NMD rs conccrned. the Ballistic
Missilc Defence Organisatron (BMDO) has de-
fined an archrtecture that could defend all the
states rn the US from a single site located in
North Dakota. This system rs able to handle only
a small number of u'arheads and it is the Ameri-
cans' response to the neu' risks that are emerging
in thc wake of the end of the cold u'ar. In fact,
the US Government and mrlrtarv had to live ri'ith
thc threat of multiple u-arhcads berng used by the
other superpou'er during the cold r.r'ar, but the
situation has changed and the nsk is nou' spread
among several small roguc nations, so the United
States has had to adapt thc cold-u,ar standards of
rts defence architecture
78. The current NMD architecture as pro-
posed is based on a system that relies on existing
space-based assets, upgrades existing early-
rvarning and X-band radar facilities, and foresees
the deplol,rnent of an imtial capability of 20
ground-based interceptor missiles tipped rvith
exoatmospheric kill vehicles and based at Grand
Forks, North Dakota. These elements rvill be
combined rvith the battle managemcnt command,
control and communications (BM/C3) systcm.
The architecture rvill be under the control of the
Commander-in-Chief of US Space Command
(CINC Space), which means he u'ill also have
the authority to release a ground-based intercep-
tor missilc. The estrmated cost of developrng
such a s)'stem is US $2.5 billion
79. The architecturc of any ballistic missile
defcnce (BMD) s)'stem is divided into two main
segments early u'arning and operational defence.
In the next section thel' urll be analysed from a
marnll,political point of vieu'
Early warnng
80. In order to destrol' a target, it is important
to be able to see and track rt, and that is u'hat the
carll'-*'arning scgment does In fact, its mam
purpose in the BMD architecture is to give the
alert that a mrssrle has been launched and speci$
its direction. This makes it possible to take
countermeasures or strike back. This kind of ac-
tivity' entarls the use of ground-based radar and
telescopes, airborne s)'stcms and space-based
technologl'
8l As far as North American aerospace de-
fence is concerned, responsibrlrtl' for aerospace
\\-amlng and control lics rvith a bi-natronal
(United States and Canadran) organrsatron the
North American Aerospace Defence Command
(NORAD) Aerospace \\.arnrng rncludcs the
morutorrng of man-made oblccts rn space, and
thc detection, vahdation. and rvarnrng of an at-
tack against North Amerrca u'hether by arrcraft,
mrssile, or space vehiclcs. utrlising mutual sup-
port arrangements s'ith the other commands
82. The commander rn chrcf (CINC) of
NORAD rs appointed b1,. and is also responsrblc
to, the President of the Unrted States and the
Pnme Mrnister of Canada His headquarters arc
locatcd at Peterson Air Force Base (Colorado)
u,hrch also accommodates the 2lst Space Wrng
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of the l4th Arr Force that is responsible for op-
erating satellites and ground-based missile sen-
sors world-u'rde in order to provide data to
NORAD for assessment of threats to North
America, and the US Space Command for as-
sessment of threats to US and Allied troops de-
plol'ed rvorldrvide Frnally, the command and
control centre is not far away, at Chel,enne
Mountain Air Statron, Cheyenne Mountain
(Colorado) and serves as a central collection and
coordination facrlrty for a world-wide system of
sensors designed to provide the CINC and the
National Command Authorities of the United
States and Canada u'ith an accurate picturc of
any aerospace threat.
83 In conclusion, CINCNORAD is responsi-
ble for provrdrng integrated tactical lvaming and
atLack assessment (ITWAA) but information rs
needed in order to accomphsh this mission. The
system architecture consists of several segments.
one is under the control of CINCNORAD and
the others are operated by commands supporting
NORAD, such as the US space command. For
the purpose of ensuring a timely flou, of u,arning
informatron. CINCNORAD and CINC Space are
one and the same person
84. The US Space Command supports
NORAD's actrvrty by providing missile warnlng
and space surverllance It rs the duty ofthe Space
Defence Operatrons Centre (SPADOC), located
in the Colorado Springs area, to rcceive mforma-
tion from the Space Surveillance Centre (SSC)
that is based on a u,orld-wide network of active
and passrve sensors used to track anlthing that
overflies or mrght overfly North American terri-
tory at an altrtude lon'er than that of deep space
Thrs mternatronal net*'ork rs called the Space
Dctectron and Trackrng System (SPADATS) and
each day,' rt makes about 30 000 observatrons, all
of u'hich are transmltted to the SSC's computers
Once the data arrrves in Colorado, it is analysed
and particular attentron is of course pard to an1,
unknoun ob.;ects
85 The space-based early, rvarning sy'stem rs
also managed bv the US Space Command and
compnses several constellations of satellrtcs in
high orbit In fact, hrgh resolution technology rs
not necessary to accomplish an earl1,-u'arnrng
mission but a u,rde field of view' rs extremely, rm-
portant. Srnce missrles are boosted by hot gascs,
mfrared (IR) camera are the best tools to use
Early u'aming satellrte payloads are tlpically IR
camera programmed for the specific rvavelcngths
of heat emrtted by combustion elements. Backup
payloads are also provided in order to avoid false
wamlngs.
86. In the event of a missile attack against the
US, thc alert takes about five minutes to arrive in
Washrngton That does not leave enough timc to
organisc a defence or move the population into
safe shelters but it does provide sufficient u'arn-
ing for the pulposes of striking back. Thrs krnd
of strategv rvas possible during the cold war
since Soviet logic n'as in many respects srmrlar
to Westem logic. In contrast, the phenomenon of
rehgrous fanaticism makes the Iogrc of a second
strrke completely useless sincc the adversarl' rs
not afrard of dcath and devastatron. In thrs sensc
the archrtecture of the US ballistic missrle de-
fence system must change and x'hen rt comes to
developing such a svstem in Europe, considera-
tron should be grven to the fact that European
countrles are not far au'av from rogue natrons in
u,hrch this phenomenon rs rrfe.
87. One example of a US Department of De-
fence (DoD) earlr'-u'arning programme is the
DSP-647s (Defence Support Programme series
647) rvhrch is so important that the DoD has fin-
anced the estabhshment of thc ground station of
Nurrungar (Austraha) Another example is the
Buckley Air Natronal Guard Base (Colorado)
u.here the 82lst Spacc Group of the l4th Air
Force is statroned. The 21st Space Wing of the
Peterson Air Force Base also has unrts that op-
eratc early,-rvarnrng satellrtes and report u'arning
information.
88 The earlr'-n'arning programme had rn the
1960s been callcd MIDAS; rts mrssron objectrve
s'as the dctectron of nuclcar expenments and rt
also had meteorologrcal capabilitres. but after
some information had been umntentronally re-
leased, the programme's name u'as changed to
DSP-647 and some of rts charactenstics u'ere
modrfied
89 In I969, the Pcntagon provrded thc follou'-
rng information about the svstem the ri,eight of
the satellrte u'as bctu'ccn 800 and 1300 kg de-
pending on u,hat pavload rr.as chosen, its sensors
u'ere simrlar to the VELA satcllrte sensors and
therefore consrsted of partrcle-detection sensors.
electromagnetic radiatron-detectlon sensors,
equlpment capable of X-ra1, and gamma-ray
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measurements 
- 
i.e. able to detect a nuclear ex-
plosion in the atmosphere as well as underground
- 
a secondary payload with the missron of
avoiding confusion between solar radiatlon re-
fraction and the launch of a mrssile or a laser
atta.ck against its early-warning sensors, and so
on.
90. The core of the DSP-647 is an IR tele-
scope and the satellites orbit at about 35 000-
36 000 km from the earth's surface, inclined at
an angle of 0" rvith respect to the equatorial
plane. Usualll, the constellation is composed of
three satellites: one located over the Indian
Ocean, the second over the Pacific Ocean and the
third over the Atlantic Ocean. Naturally, their
posrtions ma), vary dcpendrng on the strategic,
operational and tactrcal needs of the United
States.
91. All the US remotc-sensing satellites are
called "Keyhole" and one of the latest rdeas for
carl1,-n,arning space-based architccture consists
of an unmanned and multi-function space statron
called KH-13, able to observe the earth con-
stantly It is possible to rmagme that a numbcr of
the characteristics of the Strategrc Defence Ini-
tiativc tcchnologv of the mid-I980s could be rn-
cluded rn this project Up trll nou,, the KH-13 has
existed on paper only and given the financial
problems affectrng several defence programmes
in the US, rt urll probably go on exrsting in that
form for some trme to comc
92 Since the DSP-647 programme is on the
verge of becoming obsolete, the DoD rs planning
a ne\\' architecture for an earl1,-1v4.ring capabrl-
rt1' that u'ould also be able to carr)' out rts mis-
sion rn a post-cold u'ar environment x'here rt is
crucial to reducc the timeframe from a launch to
an alert to action since, as has alreadl' been ob-
servbd, enemies may be closer and not scared bv
a second strike The programme that rs supposed
to replace the DSP-647 is the space-based rnfra-
red system (SBIRS) Its space archrtecturc con-
srsts of trvo satellites in a highlr' elhptrcal orbit or
Molnla orbrt and four satellrtes in geostatronary
orbit (GEO) for the purpose of provrdrng early
u,arning capabr[tres The first dehven' is planned
for 2001 It rs also planned to put a constellation
of satcllites called thc Space and Mrssrlc Track-
ing Sl,stcm (SMTS) Brilliant E1'es into lorv earth
orbit (LEO) to track mrssilcs once launched Ini-
tial deliven' of thrs svstem rs planncd for 2004.
For the SBIRS in GEO, an application as a sat-
ellite-tracking sl,stem is also planned rn addition
to the ground-based system currently deployed
rvorld-rvide by the US Space Command.
93. In the field of theatre ballistic missile dc-
fcnce, it is rmportant not only to have an early-
warnmg capability regarding a missile launch but
also to make such information available at op-
eratronal lcvcl. To this end the US Army and
Nar.y have crcated Jornt Tactical Ground Station
(JTAGS) uruts to provide'an1' operations theatre
wrth information from the DSP satellites. In fact,
their mission rs to grve attack lvarnings so that
fighter aircraft and ground artillcry can attack
the transporter erector launchers (TELs). These
stations had been planned beforc the Gulf War
and the onll, reason xhy they were not deployed
at that trme rvas that thel'werc not avarlablc
91 In conclusion, it is important to undcrline
that the space-based and ground-based early'-
u'aming systems are not the onll' ones avarlable
Arrborne sensors can also provide inputs in thrs
field even rf their usefulness is confined to the
thcatre area The use of laser remote-sensrng is
quitc intcrcsting because rn these sensors because
it reprcscnts a new application of laser technol-
ogy
95 Laser remote-sensing rs based on the
prrnciplcs of optrcal absorption spectroscopl, that
involvcs passing thc hght of knorm spectral
characteristics through a tzrget medium and ob-
serving u'hich u'avelengths are absorbed by thc
medium Particular molccules u-ill resonate at
specrfic u'avelengths and in doing so the1, 26ro16
hght at those rvavelengths, since each chcmical
compound mav cmlt characteristrc spcctra if
surtably' excited
96 The rcason u'hv this technologv rs not
space-based is because the atmospherc. togethcr
u'rth dust and vapour, influences the perfonnancc
of such systems. If the archrtecture \\'ere space-
bascd it rvould requirc an enorrnous amount of
po\\,er, rvhrch uould pose management problems
Horvever, thrs technolog)'can be used for atmos-
pheric studres. for damage assessment in the
event of strrkes and also for earlv-x'arning for
TMD, slncc somc mrssrlcs produced b1, roguc
countries arc strll using hqurd fuel that partialli'
evaporatcs u'hen the missrle rs prepared for
launch
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97. Once a missile launch has been detected
and its trajectory tracked, the only thing that re-
mains to be done is to destroy, it and move the
population into safe shelters. The focus hcre is on
neutralising the incoming missile but rt is also
important to remember that bunkers for people
can be a form of ABM defence, although the
main problem is how to prevcnt missiles from
destroy'ing the infrastructure as well.
Anti -b a I h s ti c mi s s i le defence
98. This section contains a description of US
choices in the field of ABM defence, taking into
consideration the fact that it is possible to choose
behl'een tu'o kinds of architecture: endoatmos-
pheric defence architecture (r.e. u'ithin the at-
mosphere) and exoatmosphenc defence architec-
ture (i.e. outside the atmosphere). In general, it rs
possrble to say, that the US programmes are
mostly based on exoatmospheric architecture.
The reasons are numerous and includc the fact
that in order to attack the US rvith a missile, the
adversarl' must use an intercontinental missile.
The US Government is no doubt doing everl'-
thing possible to avert a threat from a hostile
country possessrng ballistic missrle capabilities
rvithin the American continent. In fact, part of the
trajecton' of an intercontinental mrssile lies in the
upper atmosphere or beginning of outer space.
Moreover, the advantage of intercepting missiles
there rs that atmospheric drag u'ill destroy all the
pieces of a missrle that has been attacked, which
means that even a lou-precision interceptor can
accomplish the mission Also. because mtercep-
tion of a \\'eapon of mass destruction (fitted with
a nuclear or other u-arhead) takes place m space,
it is probablv suffrcrentll' far a$'ay to prevent
much damage on earth
99. It is also possrble to use a krnetic kill
vehicle, or a high-energl' beam, to dcstrov a
missile and electronic support measures (ESM)
can be taken to misgurdc the mrssrlc but there are
no specific programmes for this partrcular pur-
pose.
100. As rvell as having its oun programmes, the
United States is involved in various ABM pro-
grammes rn coopcration u,ith Europe, through the
Medium Extended Air Defence System
(MEADS) and Israel. through Arrorr,. It also
conducts jornt studies u'ith Japan. Its own pro-
grarnmes focus on US self-defence agarnst the
ballistic missile threat. It could rvell be the case
that Canada relies on American defence profi-
ciency, since the extent of its rnvolvement in
ABM defence prograrnmes is not knorm, other
than its joint early,-warning capabrlrties with the
US.
Exoat mos phe n c pr o gra mme s
l0l. These progriunmes began in the mid-1980s
under the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), also
nicknamed Star Wars. The main architecture of
the system consisted in constellations of earll,-
warning satellitcs. whrch could also destroy
ICBMs in their exoatmospheric tra.;ectory before
they relcased therr multrple u,arheads. The ra-
tionale and archrtecture of the SDI u'as described
in Assembly Document 1435. It is s'orth repeat-
ing here that the architecture of the SDI rvas de-
veloped in response to cold u'ar threats and to
promote an American economic effort that the
Soviet Union could not afford
102. One of the elements of the SDI architec-
ture rvas the use of lasers to counteract the bal-
listic missile threat. In fact. thc usefulness of
lasers for air dcfcnce has been under rnvestiga-
tron since the 1970s Work on such systems con-
tinued through the 1980s urth the Airborne Laser
Laboratory', u'hrch completed the first test laser
intercepts above the earth The space-based laser
(SBL) prograrnme u'ill burld on a rvide variety of
technologres developed by the Strategic Defence
Inrtiative Organisation (SDIO) in the 1980s. The
SBL platform achieves mrssile interception by
focusmg and maintaining a high-porvered laser
on a target untrl rt is destrol'ed The energy nec-
essary to perform thrs mrssron is generated b1, a
chernical reaction of the hl drogcn fluorrdc mole-
cule.
103 Research on the large optrcs demonstration
expenment (LODE). completcd in 1987, pro-
vided scicntists ri-ith the means to control the
beams of large, high-porvercd lasers, and under
the large advanced mirror programme (LAMP) a
4-metre drametcr space mlrror u'rth the required
optical figure and surfacc qualitr uas designed
and burlt.
104 In this context, the satellrte relay mirror
experiment (RME) rvas launched rn 1990 rvith
the purpose of experimenturg with the targeting
techniques of space laser mrrrors. Its mirror in-
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tercepted a laser beam from Mount Haleakaia in
l99l before the satellite rvas deactivated.
105 In the same 1'ear, the Alpha laser achieved
megarvatt po\\'er at the requisite operating level
in a lorv-pressure environment and numerous
acqursition tracking and pointing/fire control
(ATP/FC) experiments are taking place m order
to provide the SBL platform u,ith stable aim-
points. In 1995, trials conducted under the space
pointing integrated control experiment demon-
strated a performance close to rveapons level.
106. Future projccts conceming the SBL in-
clude the SBL readiness demonstrator (SBLRD)
to tcst all the components of the system together
in their planned working environment. The
SBLRD satcllrte ri,ill comprise four major sub-
systems:
- 
the ATP sy,stem, which u'rll provrde not
onlv acquisition, tracking and targcting
capabilities but also stabihsation and
assessment capabilities,
the lascr dcvicc,
- 
the optics and beam control svstems to
enhance the capabilitics of thc laser
devrce;
thc space system to provide a stablc
platform and fumish elcctncal power
(othcr than for the laser) and so on.
107. Current SBL plannrng is based on a 20-
satellrte constellation since it is estimated that a
12-satellrte constellation with the same charactcr-
istics. i.e. kill times per missile ranging from one
to ten seconds and re-targeting trmes as lou' as
0 5 seconds, can negate 94Y" of all mrssile
thrcats in most theatre scenarios
108. As far as kinetic weapons are concerned,
thc devclopment of ground-based rnterceptors
(GBIs) rs the mam component of the American
NMD prograrrrme. The exoatmospheric kill ve-
hicle (EKV) is expected to undergo intercept
flrghts in 1998 and, at the moment, rvork rs fo-
cuscd on the technical aspects of the interceptor
secker.
109. It is possible that the architecture of the
EKV system rvrll consist of a ground-based rn-
tcrceptor guided by a space-bascd seeker, or by a
ground-based or arrbornc missile launched out-
side the atmosphere in ordcr to destroy a missile
beforc rt releases its multiple warheads. Current
international lari, prohibits the use of mrssile-
armed satellites cven though the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty and subsequent treaties do no more
than prohibit the use of rveapons of mass de-
struction In any case such svstems are too costly
and the same performances can be obtained using
ground-based and airborne technology.
ll0. Still in the field of exoatmospheric kinetic
krll vehicles, the theatre high altitude area dc-
fence (THAAD) system is designed to become a
land-based upper tier TMD system and rs also
descnbed in Assembly Document 1435. For this
reason, the discussion here rvill be limited to a
brief reminder of the basis of this programme and
its development since 1994. Three inrtial phase
tests took place in 1995 and tu'o in 1996 but un-
fortunately, the results rvere not satisfactory.
IIl. Thc THAAD is an arm)' programmc
u'hose architecture consists of four major seg-
ments:
- 
truck-mounted launchers to protect and
transport the interceptors;
- 
interceptors ivhich consist of a single-
stage booster and a kinetic kill vehrcle;
- 
thc THAAD radar s1'stem rvhich sup-
ports the full range of sun'erllancc, tar-
get tracking and fire control functions,
and providcs a communication hnk
rvith the interceptor in flrght,
the battle management command, con-
trol, communicatrons, computer and
intelligence s),stcm (BM/C4I) rvhich
managcs and integrates all the architec-
turc segments by providing instructions
and communrcations and b1' proccsslng
data gathered by sensors.
ll2 In 1996, the Dcpartment of Defence
(DoD) restructured the programme bv militarrs-
ing the user operational evaluation system
(UOES) and upgradrng certarn components. such
as the rnfrared seeker. and thc rcmaining seg-
ments Moreover, a UOES capabrlrty' that rn-
cludes two THAAD radars, four launchers, tu'o
BM/C4I s1'stems, 40 missiles, and 295 soldiers is
plarured to be available for developmental testing
b1' Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 and the first unrt
equippcd (FUE) date for TIIAAD is scheduled
for FY 2006
l5
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I13. In addition, the nary is also carrying out a
thcatre-wide defence prograrnme, rvith the aim of
provrding the US forces rvrth an upper-trcr bal-
hstic missile defence capabilitl'without the need
for land bases. Thrs is the second evolutionary
stage of the naw area defence programme, and it
is planned to use an interceptor rvith an exoat-
mospheric capability, such as the lightweight
exo-atmospheric projectile (LEAP) During in-
tercepting tests agalnst targets outside the earth's
atmosphere, LEAP technology components per-
formcd well. whrch probabll' means that technr-
cal demonstration flights u'ill be possible by'
2000
Endoat mo s phe n c pro gra mme s
ll4. As far as endoatmospheric prograrnmes
are concerned, the devices used for ABMD pur-
poses can be drvided rnto two categories: energy
weapons and krnetic rveapons As has alreadl,
been explained, energy \\'eapons are character-
ised by the fact that energl' concentrated into
beams is used to destroy' missiles Wrth kinctrc
\\'eapons on the other hand, the same goal rs
achieved using an object that explodes near the
mrssrle and dcstroys rt. It rs rmportant to under-
hne the drffrcultres rnvolved in such krnds of
mrsslons because destroying a missrle amounts to
launchrng one proJectile agarnst anothcr u'hrle
trf ing to rntercept the first Holever, it has been
dcmonstrated that rt rs possrble to do this, even if
the farlure rate is usualll' hrgh, rt is thcrefore
rvorth hstrng the krnd of programmes being car-
ned out in the United States
I l5 In the field of energy'\\'eapons there is just
one prograrnme: the arrbome laser sy'stem. Its
mrsslon architecture rs composed of a ground
segment for command. control and communrca-
tron (C3) purposes and an aeroplane, the Boerng
747 that carnes the laser devrce.
l16 The purposc of the ABL programme rs to
desrgn and dcvclop conccpts to mrnrmisc engi-
neering risks for arrborne. high-energv laser
\\'capons capablc of acqurrrng, tracking and krll-
ing theatre balhstrc missrles rn boost phase. Thrs
s)'stem is developed bv thc USAF Phrlhps Labo-
ratory and the final uscr rs the Arr Combat
Command (ACC) Boerng and Rocku'ell Interna-
tional proposed competrng engmeerrng design
concepts. The system architecturc rs composcd of
a nose-mounted turrct, a chemrcal ox1'gen-iodrne
laser, and a 747 aircraft The contract to build
the laser was au'arded to the Boeing-led contrac-
tor, which also includes TRW and Lockheed
Martin, last November.
ll7 . One milestone has been the successful
demonstratron of the active tracking system built
on a ground-based illuminator tested against a
navy F-14D. In additron, a demonstration of the
full-porver flrght-rveightcd laser module rvill take
place in April 1998..
ll8. It rs planned that the ABL mission rvrll
comprise the folloii'ing phases:
the target is visuahsed by nine infrared
scarch and tracking scnsors situated on
the aeroplane;
a tracker/rllumrnator laser is fired from
the turret of thc ABL to illuminate the
nose of the targct booster,
- 
a bcacon/illuminator is activated to
mark a narro\\' spot on the target fuel
tank rn ordcr to provide the path for the
lethal shoot.
- 
the signal of drstortion due to the at-
mosphcre rs sensed by u'avefront sen-
sors that send the signal to deformable
mlrrors,
the deformablc mrrrors pre-distort the
hrgh-energl'laser beam so that it is re-
focused b1, the atmosphere to become
lethal once it hits rts target.
- 
the high-energv laser beam is activated
against thc targct.
I19. All rnformation concerning ranges and
mrssions rs classified but rt is knonn that it is
planned that the arrcraft ri'ill fli' at 12 000 m
because, nommallr'. thc laser must attack the
mrssile u'ithin about 40 seconds rf the nomrnal
burnout is 80 seconds for a 90-km range mrssile
The ABL iiill be 
.;ust one of the components of
the NMD archrtecturc and of the theatre mrssrlc
defencc archrtecture
120 Strll in the field of laser \\'eapons, the mid-
infrared advanced chemrcal laser (MIRACL),
u,hrch is a deutenum fluonde chcmrcal laser, rs
the hrghest avcrage po\\'er laser in the US It can
bc used agalnst anr oblect that passes rvithin rts
field of vieu, both insrde and outsrde the atmos-
phere TRW has burlt thc MIRACL for the na',y,
w'hich u'ill tcst rt against cruse and ballistrc
l6
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missiles. At the time of wnting, a test of its anti-
satellite capabilities u,as scheduled for October
t997
l2l. The United States and Israel are also co-
operating on a tactical high-energy laser s1'stem
THEL) u'hich this year received US$ l5 million.
It is plarured that this system lvill be a key com-
ponent of the integrated air defence system
(IADS) s'here the United Statcs Marine Corps
(USMC) doctrrnally employs an IADS for all
active defence based upon multi-role fighter air-
craft and the Harvk missile In this scenario the
THEL r,r,ill perform the role of detecting, acquir-
ing, identifumg, and destroy,ing sho( and me-
dium-range targcts, rn addrtion to operating in a
conventional and electronic rvarfare environment.
122. Whcre kinetic weapons are concemed, the
improved Harvk provides an excellent TBM core
dcfence for marinc ground forces. The nerv Harvk
s),stem u,rll consist of three major components'
the TPS-59 radar that provrdes target
detectron, drscrimination, and tracking,
- 
the Harvk launcher that transports,
protects and launches the mrssiles, and
the Hau'k missile,
the air defcnce communication platform
(ADCP) that connects the TPS-59 u'rth
the Hawk and the remarndcr of the
theatre missile defence archrtecture in
order to create missile defence rn dcpth
123 The Naw, and the BMDO have been
u-orkmg together to develop a sea-based area
defence capabilitv n'hich burlds on the existrng
Aegis/Standard mrssrle air defence sy,stem, in
order to extend its anti-arr capabilitres to enable
the detectron, trackrng and engagement of TBM
124. The marn advantages of the na\,a' area
BMD programme rnclude
- 
conflict deterrence,
- 
protection of US forces dcploy'ed to
crrsis areas,
- 
in-depth defcnce to reassurc allies,
- 
a rcduction in the demand for sea and
arrhft. since a sea-based ABM rvrll cn-
ablc the theatre commander to concen-
trate available lift capabrlrtres on anti-
arrnour tanks, troops, ammunitron and
other operations in order to stop the en-
emy advance.
125 The US army's endoatmospherrc kinetrc
wcapon ABM progr;urrme is the famous Patrrot
missile, norv upgraded to advanced capabilitres in
the PAC-3 versron. Today it is considered to be
the core of the TMD programmes, and also has
one of thc highest priorities in the development of
BMD systems wrthrn the US.
126. The PAC-3 version presents a number of
improvements, especiallf in the field of BM/C41,
and incolporates the guidance enhancemcnt
missilc (GEM) The first unit rvas equippcd rvrth
configuration I in December 1995
127 . In 1997 the arm1, began to field configura-
tron 2 ri'hrch fcatures further improvements and
modificatrons to the radar, communications and
other svstems In February 1997, the PAC-3
configuration 2 svstem successfully engaged a
theatrc-class balhstic missile
128 The PAC-3 archrtecture rs based upon
four basrc segmcnts
- 
thc radar set that provides uarning and
tracking of rncoming thrcats.
the engagement control statron (ECS)
that computes fire solutions for the in-
terceptor, and provrdes fire control and
communlcatron lmks $'ith the other
unrts.
the launch stations rvhrch transport,
protcct and launch thc missilcs Each of
them can be cqurpped u'ith four GEMs
or earher mrssrles and selectcd stations
arc able to carn' l6 PAC-3 mrssrlcs,
- 
the interceptors that are hrghli' man-
oeuvrablc and are consrdcred efficient
on the basrs of thc tests that har,e been
conductsd
129 Compared u'rth the Patriot. thc PAC-3
version rs smaller but characterrsed by an cn-
hanced radar- improved sumvabrlrtr', rncreased
rangc and a launch point detcrmrnation capabrl-
rt1', rcsultrng rn rncrcased firepou'er and lethalrtv
Nafional balhstrc nussrle defence
130 As u'as notcd at the begrnnrng of thrs
chaptcr- thc Unrtcd Statcs' BN{D prograrrunes
are drvrdcd into TN{D and NMD Thc first of
l7
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these has maximum pnonty and includcs all the
prograrnmes described above.
l3l. The trends in international policy, mostly
in the field of the spread of rveapons of mass de-
struction and long-range missile capabilities, rep-
resent a threat for the US and for this reason, the
BMDO drerv up the NMD prograrnme. An NMD
Joint Programme Office (JPO) ivas established to
manage the multiple-service components of an
NMD system and oversee therr rntegration into
an efficient architecture.
132. The mam purpose of this programme is to
protect the US against limited attack by long-
range missiles and to provide a quick response to
such attacks. The NMD programme has a de-
plolment readiness posture that involves
developing hardu'are that rvill be used in FY
1999 integrated sy'stem test (IFT-5)
133. This programme is composed of a number
of segments that include the USAF SBIRS, the
ground-based interccptor (GBI) able to destroy'
missrles outside the atmosphere and the ground-
based radar (GBR) u'hrch provides thc primary
fire control sensor to support integrated NMD
s1'stem testing on the US Army Ks'ajalein Atoll
missile test range. An in-flight interceptor com-
municatrons system (IFICS) proto[pe is planned
for developmcnt rvith the aim of linking the var-
ious defence and management segments. In addr-
tion, the NMD BM/C3 project is focused on in-
tegrating thc NMD interceptor and sensor opera-
tions in support of informed decision-making and
to facilrtate programme integration.
134. As can be seen, the Unrted States is ex-
tremely concerned about missile defence and rt is
also involved in pushing NATO in this direction.
This concem is visible not only rn the number of
programmes covering this area but also rn the
funds being made available For thrs reason it is
rvorth taking a look at the follou,rng tables
shorving a break-doun of budgets bv programme,
year and user.
135. Thc BMDO budget presents several inter-
esting aspects, particularll, if consrdered from the
point of vieu' of drfferent sources, as can be seen
from the follori'ing tables
BMD progrommes budget
Source' Space News, 6-12 October 1997, p l8
US S mlhon
RDT&E 1997 approved 1998 requested
Corps SAM (MEADS) 30 48
Naw area TMD 302 268
Naw theatre-u-rde 304 195
PAC-3 382 206
THAAD system 622 556
NMD 883 _s04
Other 916 80_i
Procurements
PAC-3 215 0
Nal1'area-u,rdc 9 0
BMC3 l9 0
HAWK l9 0
Sotrrce BMDO Fact Sheet 97-36, July 1997, The Balhsnc Mtssrle Defence Ftscal Year 1997 Rudget
US $ mllton
Earlv rvarruns 1997 requested 1997 approvcd 1998 requested
SBIRS-Lori 237 5 222 4 217 4
SBIRS-Hreh 189 6 338.4 338 4
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FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY OO FY OI FY 02 FY 03
THAAD 6t9 561 595 603 618 949 980
Navy theatre rvide 304 195 192 I9l l9l 145 t49
SMTS 231 219 158 t72 244 419 92s
Airbome laser 54 157 297 323 t57 183 445
Joint aerostat 26 86 134 ll0 133
NMD 829 505 406 310 310 392 392
Patriot PAC-3 601 555 47t 459 445 433 397
Navy area TMD 310 283 27t 351 318 287 263
Joint TMD (BMDO) 508 545 5r6 546 551 540 523
Other 498 384 327 282 285 282 282
TOT 3980 3490 336',1 3347 3232 3630 4356
Source BMDO, FY 1998 Presrdent's Budget Press Release
Ballistic missile defence programmes (US $ million)
FY 98 BMDO funding by executing agent (US $ million)
Executinq agent Funds
BMDO 738
Nalry 513
Armv 119
Arr force 133
NTB/JNTF, DNA. SPACECOM 85
Sottrce BMDO, Fy 1998 Prestdent's Budget Press Release
Moreover, y'our Rapportcur ls a\\'are that the BMDO also has funds for forergn poho,use and to
support forergn BMD programmcs In each FY an amount rn US dollars rs devolved to u.estern Europe (66
million for FY 1997), East Asra (3 mrlhon for FY 1997), also. latterli'. follourng the signature of a
Memorandum of Understardrng. to Japan, to counter the threat represented by North Korea and marntam a
balance m \4e\\'of the rapid grouth of the Chrnese cconom\', and to Israel (59 milhon) for obnous political
reasons.
FY 1998 BMDOfunding (US $ million)
Field Funds
NMD 504
TMD I 835
Support technologies 249
Source BMDO, FY 1998 Prestdent's Budget Press Release
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V. Transatlantic cooperation 
- 
MEADS
136. In Februar1, 1995, France, Germany, Itall'
and the Unrted States signed an international
Memorandum of Understanding settrng up a
NATO agency for the purpose of cooperation in
the joint surface-to-air missrle progralnme knou,n
as the Medium Extended Arr-Defence Sy,'stem
(MEADS). In Ma1' 1995, France withdreu'from
the programmc on account of budgetarl' difficul-
ties and the three remaining countries signed a
Memorandum of Understanding covering the
project definition and validation phase.
137 . The arm of the programme is to develop a
surface-to-arr missile sy'stem (SAM) capable of
defending troops and rnstallations against a range
of threats: tactrcal balhstic mrssrles, cruisc mis-
siles. aircraft and UAVs. Programme costs are
shared as follorvs Unrted States 60%, Germanl,
25%o and Itall' 15% The possibilitl' of other
NATO countnes loining MEADS is cnvisaged,
urth the approl'al of the participant countnes
138 Thc programme, u'hich rs admmistercd by'
a NATO agencv. NAMEADSMA. based In
Huntsvrlle rn the Unrted States, is currentlr,' in its
pro.;ect definition and validation (PD-V) phase.
u'hich runs from 1996 to 1998. Phase 2 , Desrgn
and Development (D and D) rvill run from 1999
to 2005 rvrth Phase 3, Production, possrbly
startrng rn 2003
139 In the present rnrtial PD-V phase, the arm
rs to produce a svstem specrfication, a primarl'
end rtem spccrficatron document and a coopera-
trve programme plan for the corrrmon develop-
ment and productron of MEADS, Thrs phase
mvolves tx'o industnal teams, one compnsing
Lockheed Martin, Darmler-Benz, Sremens and
Alenra and the other Hughes and Raytheon.
Darmler-Benz. Sremens and Alema. Both teams
must compete rvrth one another for the final con-
tracts
140 The part plared by' MEADS in balhstrc
missile defence archrtecture ri'rll be to fill thc gap
betu'een man portable systems hke the Strnger
and the hrgher levels of the antr-missrle defcnce
structure such as the PAC-3 or the THAAD
Moreover MEADS urll provrdc contrnuous cover
for rapidll' advancmg manoeuvre forces. Thc
partrcular characteristics of MEADS are rts
strategrc and tactlcal mobrlrtv for easl' rn-theatre
deplol,rnent and to provrde support for forces on
the move.
l4l. Once in service, MEADS rvill be the only'
anti-missile defence svstem capable of being
transported alongside troops and of being
brought into service immediately. It will also
have greater fire-pou'er but require less man-
power than its predeccssors. Finally, the fact
that the system is based on a jomt design should
contribute to rnteroperability.
142. Integral to the MEADS system xill be an
arrborne radar sensor providrng early rvammg
against lou'-altitude cruise-missile attack agamst
aircraft targets, u'hich can either be aircraft or
helicopter-borne or UAV or aerostat-mounted.
Furthcrmore MEADS rvill be fullf intcrcon-
nected rvith other svstems such as Patriot,
TFIAAD and FSAF Aster
143. MEADS u'rll replace the Hawk arr defence
s1'stem. In the late 1980s and the earlv 1990s,
the US Arml-and Naw'embarkcd on the CORPS
SAM prograrrrme as an rntended replacement for
Harvk Germanv shou'ed an mterest rn 
.;oining
and France and Itall' drd likew'rse shortly' after-
s'ards Once the internatronal MoU u'as signcd
in February 1995, the CORPS SAM programmc
became knoqn as MEADS.
144 MEADS ls an important tntttative rn
transatlantrc cooperatlon The rnternational na-
ture of the programme means it has enormous
potcntial for promoting transatlantic interoper-
abrlity, Accordrng to the BMDO (Ballistic
Mrssile Defencc Organrsation), MEADS
"reaffirms the Unrted States' commltment to sta)
rnr,'olved in European securih' affarrs and could
spark a renalssance rn transatlantrc cooperatton"
145 General Joulu'an. the thcn Commandcr-m-
Chref of the US European Command. rn Jull
1995 u'rote a lelter to the Amerrcan Senator.
Sam Nunn, m u.hrch he statcd that ''Polrtrcallr'.
MEADS rs a vrsrblc and rmportant tllustratron of
the US commltment to mrssrle defence. to NATO
and to Europc MEADS rs a model for future
transatlantrc cooperatlon efforts Termrnattng
MEADS nou' u.ould havc serrous ramrficatrons
in other ongolng coopcratlve vsntures and ratsc
yet another round of porgnant questrons about
US intentrons regardrng leadcrship in NATO"
Ftnallr', General Joulu-an. rn hrs detennlnatlon to
obtarn thc nccessary budget support from the
20
DOCUMENT 1588
Senate, remarked that TMD sy,stcms ivere so
dear that developing them unilaterally would put
them way out of reach, and cooperation thus of-
fered additional advantages: "it appears that rve
can protect our forces and interests rvhile realis-
ing potentrally large savings".
W. NATO and anti-missile defence
146. As far as Tactical Ballistic Missile De-
fence (TBMD) is concerned, there are trvo direc-
torates rvithin NATO's Defence Support Divi-
sion: the Air Dcfence and Airspace Management
(ADAM) and Armaments Planning, Programmes
and Policy (APPP) Directorates The ADAM
Directorate supports the NATO Air Defence
Commrttee (NADC) chaired by the Dcputl, Sec-
retarl,-General, consrsting of membcr country
representatives at senror level and responsible for
advisrng the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on
the air-defence policy, of the Alhance
147. The NADC has oversight of NATO's air
defence plans and submits recommendations to
the NAC on pnorities for the organisation's
future air defence s)'stem.
148 The NADC has trvo sub-panels, the Panel
on Air-Defence Philosophy' and the Panel on Air
Defence Weapons (PADW), both of rvhrch have
u'orked on TBMD in recent 1,ears. The PADW
has concentrated in particular on maintaining a
balanced air defence system which can cope wrth
the complete spectrum of potentialll, threatening
air vehicles srnce TMBD forms but part of u,hat
in total rs termed Extendcd Arr Defcnce (EAD).
149. PADW's pnman, responsrbrlitl, is to ad-
vise and assrst the NADC develop a rational air
defence (rncludrng command and control aspects)
and a coordrnated programme for arr-defence
\\'eapons. thc Alhance Long-ternt Air-Defence
Programmc The programme keeps abreast of
national air defence procurement plans. main-
tains regular oversight of the same rn order to
idcntrfu areas rvhere they might cause an rmbal-
ance in the Alhance's air defences and makes
recommendatrons to avord this happening
150. Thus, as far as TMBD is concemed, note
s'ill bc takcn of an1, natronal plan to develop or
procure a glven capabilitv and an opinron gil'en
on the impact such actron could have on the Alli-
ance's air defcncc pohcy'
15l. The PADW has conducted a series of con-
ceptual and operational studies on TBMD and
sponsored other technological studies carried out
by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group
(NrAG)
152. Lastly, conceming NATO's rnternal or-
ganisation of work on the TBMD, it should be
noted that the APPP Directorate supports the
Conference of National Armaments Drrectors
(CNAD) u'hrch has responsibility, for armaments
cooperation. Within the same directorate, the
Planning and Policy Section is tasked, tnter alia
with providing support to an ad hoc CNAD
group rvrth special responsibility for examining
possible TBMD svstems and identifuing oppor-
tunitics for multinatronal industrial cooperation.
153. Prohferatron of balhstic missrlcs has been
a source of grou'rng concern in the Alhance for
some years 
- 
a prcoccupation reflected in its
l99l Rome Declaration and in the Nex' Strategic
Concept, pubhshed m November of the same
yoar In Junc 1992, the NAC indrcated that the
NADC rvould study various approaches tou,ards
mecting requirements for a tactrcal ballistic
missile defence sy'stem. The NADC thus dcvel-
oped a conccptual frameu'ork for provrding the
Alliancc and its forces with an extended air de-
fence, payng partrcular attention to risks from
ballistic mrssiles.
154. Thc frames'ork enusages development of
an extended air defence complementarl, to thc
existing intcgrated arr defence sy'stem The
frameu'ork was approved by the Councrl in
August 1993 and rncluded a multinational inte-
grated structurc for surveillancc and earlv rvarn-
ing against thc threat of tactical balhstrc missile
attack and to support actrve and passive coun-
termeasures.
155. The NADC also produced a report on tac-
tical ballistrc mrsslle countermeasures and prc-
sented its Air Defencc Programme for 1995-
2010 At that same.yuncture. the Supreme Hcad-
quartcrs Alhcd Pon,ers Europe (SHAPE) began
rvork on a formal military opcratronal require-
ment for theatre missilc defence rn Allrcd Com-
mand Europe
156. The summrt of Alliancc heads of state and
of government rn Brussels in 1994 took an im-
portant step touards laying doun a frameu,ork
for thc Extended Air Defence/Theatrc Mrssile
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Defence (EAD/TMD) by its formal recognition
of the threat to security presented by the prolif-
eration of rveapons of mass destruction and bal-
listic missiles. As a result, the NAC established
the Senior Politico-Militarl' Group on Prolifera-
tion (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on
Proliferation (DGP).
157. The rvork carried out by both groups led to
the drawing-up of the Alliance Pohcy'Frameu'ork
on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
made public at the June 1994 NAC mecting
This highhghted thc fact that a number of states
on the periphery of the Alliance \\'ere continuing
their attempts to develop or procure production
capabilities for rveapons of mass destruction,
which implied a direct threat to member states
and their forces. It also notcd that proliferation
could still occur, notrvrthstanding international
non-proliferation lcgislatton and treaties. Lastly'
it emphasised that the Alliance's response to such
threats must bc to endeavour to deter prolifera-
tion and the use of such \\'eapons and, if neces-
sary, defend NATO territorl', populations and
forces by political and milrtary means.
158. From a polrtrcal point of vierv the marn
Alliance objective is to deter proliferation, or,
should it succeed, try and reverse rt by diplo-
matic means. The international u'eapons control
and non-proliferatron regimes are tnstruments
available to prevent or counter proliferatron.
Nevertheless the Alhance recognises that polrtrcal
means are not alrvays suffrcient. It has therefore
tasked the DGP to study u'hat capabilrties are
necessan/ to deter proliferatron of nuclear, bro-
Iogrcal and chemical (NBC) \\'eapons. to assess
thc threat from them or their usc and to identrfi'
the means necessar)'to protect tcrritory. popula-
trons and forces.
159 The DGP's u'ork u'as drvided into three
phases During the first, studies u'ere made of
risks for the Alliance derrving from prohfcration
of u,eapons of mass destructron and the June
1994 Summit Declaration referred to above,
stressing that the prohferatton of such \\'eapons
and their deliverl' means prescnted a real chal-
lenge in terms of NATO's securitl', u'as rattfied.
The Dcclaration also made reference to rtsks due
either to ilhcit production or transfer
160 The second phase, u'htch u'as completed tn
November 1995 considered the imphcatrons of
proliferation for Alhance plans, and rdentified a
series of capabilities necessar)' to support the
organisation's stance to contend rvith prolifera-
tion In order to asscss the implications of pro-
liferation risks thc Alhance studred threats and
possrble atLacks on both NATO territories and
populatrons and on forces deplol'ed out of area
(including humanitarian and peacekeeprng mis-
sions). Among the most important capabilities
identificd for countering proliferation rvas ex-
tended air defence u'hich includes tactical balhs-
tic missile defence for deployed forces. It thus
became clear that la1'ered defences against tacti-
cal ballistic missiles could make a major contri-
bution to the political and operational objectivcs
of the Alliance.
16l DGP's third phase rdentified the areas in
NATO's current milrtary posture, rncluding air
defcnce, where progress must be made to counter
proliferation risks
162. In line u'ith thc abovc. Dr J Davrd Marttn,
Deputy for Strategrc Relations in the BMDO,
concludes that an Alliance framervork for
EAD/TMD can provide guidelines for Alliance
members as they' contlnue to develop thcir res-
pective national approaches to the prohferation
problem.
163. Dr Martin also points out that in develop-
ing a frameu,ork for anti-mrssile defence, the Al-
liance must take into account present limited re-
sources, leadrng to the assumptton that coopera-
tion in this area must be considered rvhen tt
comes to finding a solution to proliferation
problems. In his vierv such cooperation should
take place at the levels of development, produc-
tion and of fieldrng EAD/TMD svstems and. in
addition, that it is also cssential from a militarl'
pornt of vierv since, if a comJnon s)'stem design rs
taken as the startrng point, forces can effectrvely
be rnteroperable u'herever thc1, are deplol'ed in
anv operatron u'here therr inten'entton is re-
qurred
164. Frnalll' Dr Martin stresses the tmportance
of the Alhance grvmg thought to the benefits of a
lay'ercd mrssilc defence svstem for deplol,ed
forccs, u'hich could incorporate both ground and
sea-based asscts; and as the dcln'ery rangc of
balhstrc mrssrles gro\\'s longer, NATO rvill also
have to consrder multi-ticred, u'ide area defences
for the protectron of NATO territory and popu-
Iation.
22
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WI. Conclusions
165. AII of the specific studies on proliferation
of rveapons of mass destruction, undertaken at
national or at NATO level, and the White Papers
on security and defence published by different
countries are in agreement in stating that this
form of weapons proliferation represents a threat
to international securitl, and therefore in regard-
ing it as necessar)'to establish an extended air
defence/theatre missile defence (EAD/TMD)
framervork.
166. It is clear that in order to make progress in
this direction and respond adequately to existing
risks and threats, European governments have to
make clear therr politrcal rvill and provrde the
necessary budgetary resources. Once the costs of
such an undertaking have been evaluated, rt can
be brought to fruition only through cooperation 
-
cooperation that has to be primarily, European
and transatlantic.
167. A feu' u'eeks ago at the sl.rnposium our
Commrttee organised in Munich, Rear-Admiral
Leira (NATO, Director of Armaments Plannrng,
Programmcs and Policl'), stated that that NATO
u'ould be strengthened, not u-eakened, by greater
European cohesron on defence and that such co-
hesion should rest on a solid foundation consist-
ing essentrally, of its defence industrial base. In
this connection he observed that unfortunately
there u'ere signs of asrmmetric development on
either srde of the Atlantrc. Rear-Admiral Lerra
rvent on to sav that there \\,as a growing technol-
og)' gap 'betu'een North America and Europe
u,hrch could result rn drfferent doctrmes, different
force structures, and different operational con-
cepts. If this ['ere to occur, interoperabllity and
the abrlrtl' to mount loint NATO operations
uould, rn his vreu', become academic,
168. In the first part of this report, submrtted
three I'ears ago (Documcnt 1435. to u'hrch x'e
have referred several trmes) the need rvas stressed
for WEU to stimulate debate on a European
earll'-u'arnmg system to follou' up the studres
already under u'a1, on dcveloping a European
space-based observation system. This debate has
still not taken place.
169 It is necessary to make the point that a
European earll'-rvarning s)'stem must be regarded
as essential rf a European anti-missile defence
s),stem is being proposed. It seems realistrc to
assume that the Unrtcd States rvould not make its
early-u'arning satellites available to NATO.
170. Europe must begin by acquiring its ou,n
earll'-r,r,arning si'stem, comprising tu'o geosta-
tionary satellites, rnitialll'u'ith a single frequency
and mfrarcd sensors, leaving open the possrbilrty
of later supplementing these by a second, ultra-
violet frequency
l7l. Moreover. a rvhole series of European
studies on anti-missrle defence (in France, United
Kingdom, Germanl', Itab'...) are currentll' being
completed or have alreadl' been complcted It is
possible that some northern European countries
think that a threat to the southern flank of the
Continent *'ould not affect them. Will they, be
able to make the same assumptron I0 or 15
1'ears hence?
172. A Europcan stud1, rs absolutelv necessar),
and here WEU should brrng together studies donc
at national level and draft a genuinely,European
study on the basis of them Such a study' could
consider ts'o types of dcfence ground-to-air and
air-to-air. The Astcr or MEADS svstems could
provrde a satrsfacton' ans\\'er rn the first of these
cases.
173 Finalli', r,our Rapporteur regards as en-
ttrelv relel'ant and sustarnable, the conclusions
and recommendatrons contarned in the first part
of the present rcport. to u'hrch the WEU Council.
threc 1'cars after thcrr submrssion. has strll not
replied. It rs to be hoped that the present report
and the recommcndatrons that follorv from it nrll
lcad the Councrl to agrce to proceed rn the drrec-
tion that rve ha'"'c attcmptcd to outhne rn rts
pages
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